In this paper, we examine the relationship between banks' lobbying activities, their size, financial strength, and sources of income. First, we find that banks are more likely to lobby when they are larger, have more vulnerable balance sheets, are less creditworthy, and have more diversified business profiles. We also find that banks engaged in non-traditional businesses, e.g. securitization and trading, or in highly regulated businesses, e.g. insurance, hire more lobbyists and spend larger amounts on lobbying. Finally, we observe that the announcement of the Dodd-Frank bill led to increased lobbying by banks with higher trading revenues.
Introduction
Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan's chief, is reported to have once said that lobbying is JPMorgan's seventh line of business. 1 Indeed, when it comes to lobbying expenditures, the financial services sector tops the list. From 1998 to 2010, financial firms have spent over four billion US dollars setting up in-house lobbying units and hiring external lobbyists to defend their interests. 2 Lobbying expenditures within the financial sector have more than doubled over the last decade, moving from $233mn in 2000 to over $472mn in 2010.
The heaviest spenders within the financial sector are insurance companies, followed by securities and investment firms, real estate companies, and banks. This last group is the focus of our paper. Reform and Consumer Protection Act", was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. 5 The main objective of the Dodd-Frank bill is to limit excessive risk-taking by systemically important banks that benefit from the government's safety nets. The bill covers a wide variety of topics, including banks' securitization transactions. More precisely and with regards to securitization, the legislation addresses the following points: (i) whether issuers or other parties should be required to retain a portion of the credit risk in securitization transactions; (ii) disclosure and reporting standards related to securitization transactions; (iii) representations and warranties required to be provided in securitization transactions and the mechanisms for enforcing such representations and warranties;
and (iv) due diligence requirements with respect to loans underlying securitization transactions.
Also among the numerous provisions of the bill is the so-called Volcker rule, which aims at limiting proprietary trading and alternative investments fundship by bank holding companies (hereafter BHCs; see precise definition in section 4 below). The initial version of the rule called for prohibiting BHCs completely from engaging in any proprietary trading and from investing in hedge funds and private equity. A sort of reminder of the Glass-Steagall Act, which was adopted in the aftermath of the 1929 financial crisis and prohibited commercial banks from engaging in investment banking activities. The final version of the Volcker rule is, however, less strict and allows banks to dedicate up to 3% of tier one risk capital to such activities. The softening of the restriction may, at least in part, hint to banks' success in their lobbying efforts on this issue.
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between banks' lobbying efforts, on the one side, and their size, financial strength, revenue origination, and geographical location, on the other. We also investigate the effect that the announcement of the financial regulatory reform in 2009 had on banks' lobbying activities as they relate to the revenues of their securitization and trading businesses. In order to account for the presence of many zero observations in our data, i.e. quarters in which a BHC has not lobbied, we use a two-stage Heckman estimation analysis to correct for a possible selectivity bias. Indeed, ordinary least squares (hereafter OLS) regression analyses might in our case lead to biased coefficient estimates because of the high probability mass at point zero.
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that banks are more likely to lobby when they are larger, have more vulnerable balance sheets, are less creditworthy, and have more diversified business profiles. Our second finding corroborates the fact that more diversified banks, mainly those engaged in nontraditional businesses, e.g. securitization and trading, or in highly regulated businesses, e.g. insurance, hire more lobbyists and spend larger amounts on lobbying. Similarly, banks engaged in traditional businesses, e.g. lending, lobby less intensely. Finally, we observe that since the Dodd-Frank bill was announced, the lobbying activity of banks with higher trading revenues has significantly increased.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature. The following section presents the three hypotheses we test in order to identify the main determinants of banks' lobbying activities. Section 4 describes the data collected, the variables constructed, and our estimation technique. Section 5 presents our empirical results, while section 6 highlights key characteristics of BHCs that have never lobbied over our sample period. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Related literature
Our paper provides a contribution to the literature on the determinants and effects of corporate lobbying, including (but not limited to) the lobbying activities carried out by the financial sector. This literature is quite new, as it has only recently been made possible thanks to the disclosure of lobbying expenses by US firms starting in 1998. Hill, Another issue closely linked to the relative importance of personal connections versus formal channels of political influence is the question whether a lobbyist's value comes from his or her expertise in specific technical areas or whether it comes from the connections that the lobbyist maintains with politicians and lawmakers. This topic is taken up by Bertrand, Bombardini & Trebbi (2011), whose investigation of US lobbyists' profiles and donations shows that it is connections rather than issue expertise that might be the relatively scarce resource lobbyists bring to the table.
In a broader context, our study is related to the recent literature on networks in finance, which examines the benefits that networks of social, including political, connections bring to financial firms; see, e.g., Cohen, Frazzini & Malloy (2008) and (2010).
Our contribution to the literature on corporate lobbying is threefold. First, we focus our attention on BHCs and investigate the determinants of lobbying activities specifically within the banking sector rather than for a broader set of financial firms. Although this entails working with a smaller sample set, we believe that such a focus allows us to identify the motives behind the banking sector's lobbying efforts more carefully. We are not aware of any other study taking a closer look at BHCs' lobbying determinants.
Second, we rely upon several dimensions of banks' lobbying activities by adopting a network perspective and introduce to the corporate lobbying literature a novel network metric suggested in the social networks literature by Opsahl, Agneessens & Skvoretz (2010). More specifically, besides the sum of lobbying expenses and the number of lobbyists hired, we employ a measure interacting both lobbying expenses and the number of lobbyists hired. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to consider this dimension of lobbying intensity. Third, we are the first to examine the effect of the announcement of the Dodd-Frank bill and of the Volcker rule on banks' lobbying, with a special focus on banks with higher securitization and trading revenues.
Hypotheses
We test three hypotheses to investigate the determinants of banks' decision to lobby and the intensity with which they lobby, as well as the effect that the announcement of the US financial regulatory reform in 2009 had on banks' lobbying efforts.
Hypothesis One The decision of a BHC to engage in lobbying activities can be explained by its size, financial strength, and business profile.
We expect BHCs to be more likely to lobby when they are larger, have more vulnerable balance sheets, and have more diversified businesses. Higher business diversification, in this case, proxies for a bank's engagement in non-traditional banking activities.
Hypothesis Two
The intensity with which a BHC lobbies can be explained by the breakdown of its main sources of income.
To gain more information, we look at the breakdown of BHCs' main sources of income.
In particular, we expect a positive relationship with non-traditional businesses, e.g. securitization and trading, or highly regulated businesses, e.g. insurance. Furthermore, securitization has been a politically sensitive business in the run-up to the 2007 financial crisis since it relied on mortgages and access to house ownership in the US (even for lower-income households) which has been highly encouraged by the politicians in power. 
Data and methodology
The focus of this study is on BHCs. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 broadly defines a BHC as "a company that owns and/or controls one or more US banks or one that owns, or has controlling interest in, one or more banks (www.ffeic.com)."
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors is responsible for regulating and supervising BHCs' activities, even if the bank owned by the holding company is under the primary supervision of a different federal agency, e.g. the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 6 We begin constructing our sample by taking the top 50 BHCs in terms of USD nominal value of total assets as declared in September 2010 by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFEIC). Our sample period runs from 2001:Q1 to 6 Most BHCs in our sample hold the special status of "financial holding company -domestic" (FHC), which is defined as follows:
"A financial entity engaged in a broad range of banking-related activities, created by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. These activities include: insurance underwriting, securities dealing and underwriting, financial and investment advisory services, merchant banking, issuing or selling securitized interests in bank-eligible assets, and generally engaging in any non-banking activity authorized by the Bank Holding Company Act. The Federal Reserve Board is responsible for supervising the financial condition and activities of financial holding companies. Similarly, any non-bank commercial company that is predominantly engaged in financial activities, earning 85% or more of its gross revenues from financial services, may choose to become a financial holding company. These companies are required to sell any non-financial (commercial) businesses within ten years." Source: www.ffeic.com. If there are no lobbying reports for a BHC in a given quarter, we presume that it has not lobbied and take zero as the amount invested in lobbying. 7 There is a large 
Measures of connectedness
If we interpret BHCs and lobbyists as nodes of a weighted directed network, where a link departing from BHC i to lobbyist j means "BHC i hires lobbyist j" and the weight 7 It is worth stressing that the variable of interest of our study is individual lobbying carried out by BHCs and not collective lobbying carried out by banks' trade associations. Hence, zero individual lobbying expenses do not rule out any contributions a BHC may have made to a trade association's lobbying efforts. This, however, is outside the scope of our study. Our first measure is the dummy variable LobbyDummy i,t which takes on a value of one if BHC i does lobby in quarter t, and zero otherwise. For our second measure we consider the sum of weights of all links departing from each node representing a BHC, or "node strength" in network terminology. We construct a variable LobbyExpenses i,t which expresses the total lobbying expenses of BHC i in quarter t as a part per million (ppm), i.e. 10 −6 , of its total nominal assets in the same quarter: 8
As a third measure of connectedness we take the number of links departing from each node representing a BHC, i.e. the node's "out-degree". In our case, this corresponds to the total number of both in-house and external lobbyists hired by BHC i in quarter t.
This brings to the picture the gregariousness of a node as a further dimension of its network activity. That is, we use the number of a BHC's lobbying connections as a further dimension of its lobbying efforts:
Each BHC hired on average six lobbyists per quarter throughout our sample period.
Breaking down the numbers into in-house and external lobbyists, each BHC hired on average one in-house lobbyist and five external lobbyists per quarter. 
where α is a tuning parameter. We assign to α a value of 0.5, so to give equal weights to the number of connections and to the "value" of those connections.
Banking data
For our independent variables on banks' characteristics, we refer to several sources.
One source of data are BHCs' consolidated financial statements. These statements are
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Banks' financial strength and credit risk
One first information we take from banks' financial statements is the nominal value of their total assets. We use this to normalize lobbying expenses (as described in the previous section) and to control for the size of each bank when regressing LobbyDummy and Lobbyists on the independent variables.
As a measure of a bank's financial strength we construct the variable T ierOne i,t , which is BHC i's tier one capital ratio in quarter t and is obtained by dividing the bank's tier one capital by its average total assets for leverage capital purposes. As From Compustat we obtain the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating, which is a current opinion of an issuer's overall creditworthiness, apart from its ability to repay individual obligations. Values range from AAA, meaning that the firm has an extremely strong capacity to meet its financial obligations, to D, meaning that the firm is in default.
If a bank's credit rating is not available, we take that of its parent company. In one case, namely for Commerce Bancshares, we take S&P's rating for the BHC's short-term debt, since no long-term rating is available for our entire sample period. S&P ratings are published on a monthly basis, though, for the purposes of our study, we are interested in the rating corresponding to the end of each quarter. We construct the variable Rating i,t which takes on values one (for AAA) to 22 (for D) indicating the strength of BHC i's credit rating in quarter t. The average BHC in our sample has an A rating.
Banks' sources of income
We also look at the various components of interest income and of non-interest income of each BHC. Since the breakdown of both interest income and non-interest income into their single components was not always reported in the same way during our sample period, we carry out a matching of income components over the different years. For the purposes of our study, we are mainly interested in the non-traditional and politically sensitive banking activities that were the target of the recent regulatory reform, plus the more traditional loans business. We focus on the following five income sources, all of which are expressed in percentage terms of total interest and non-interest income:
• Securitization i,t is net securitization income.
• T rade i,t is trading revenue from cash instruments and derivative instruments. This includes: (i) interest rate exposures, (ii) foreign exchange exposures, (iii) equity security and index exposures, (iv) commodity and other exposures, (v) and credit exposures.
• Insurance i,t includes (i) underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and (ii) income from other insurance activities.
• InvestBank i,t includes (i) fees and commissions from securities brokerage, (ii) investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions, and (iii) fees and commissions from annuity sales.
• Loans i,t is interest and fee income on loans in domestic and foreign offices. This Thirty BHCs in our sample were at some point in time engaged in the securitization business, and half of these BHCs over almost the entire sample period. It is also interesting to note in table 2 that, on average, securitization and trading revenues make up a very small fraction of banks' total income. This is especially true when compared to, say, income from loans. The loans business appears to remain the prevalent business of our sample BHCs, although the high standard deviation of Loans reveals large variability within the sample.
We finally quantify the degree of concentration or diversification across a BHC's business activities in each quarter. For this we use a formula similar to the Herfindahl index:
where a x,t is the share of the xth source of income in quarter t. 
Further banking data
Since we would also like to control our results for cross-sectional fixed effects, we collect additional time-invariant data on our sample BHCs. One time-invariant variable we construct is F oreign i which takes on a value of one if the BHC has a foreign (i.e. non-US) parent company, and zero otherwise. There are 11 BHCs in our sample that are foreign-owned. Another time-invariant variable we take is the location of a BHC's headquarters.
We construct the dummy variable N ewY ork i that takes on a value of one if a BHC's headquarters are located in the state of New York, and zero if they are located elsewhere. 
Estimation technique
Our final sample -after collecting the data as described above -is an unbalanced panel set comprising 49 cross sections and 39 time periods. We run panel regressions with each one of our four connectedness measures respectively on the left hand side and a set of independent variables on the right hand side. The choice of independent variables depends on which one of the three hypotheses outlined in section 3 we are testing. We include in all regressions the cross-sectional fixed effects F oreign i and N ewY ork i .
A methodological issue arises in that each one of the dependent variables describing banks' lobbying activities is bounded below, at zero. Banks that have no incentives to engage in lobbying in a certain quarter do not spend any money on such activities nor do they hire any lobbyists. Zero expenditures occur in 737 of the 1440 bank-quarter observations of our full sample. Such a probability mass at a single point implies biased
and inconsistent ordinary least squares estimates. One way to deal with a potential selectivity bias is to run a two-stage Heckman procedure (see Heckman (1979) ). Here, a probit model (the so-called 'selection equation') is used in a first stage to predict the probability of a BHC's decision to lobby in a given quarter; in a second stage, the inverse Mills' ratio is included as a regressor (IM R) in an OLS model (the so-called 'response equation') identifying the determinants of a BHC's lobbying intensity.
In order to test the first hypothesis, namely that a bank's decision to engage in lobbying activities can be explained by its size, financial strength, and business profile, we run the following probit regression:
In order to test the second hypothesis, namely that the intensity of a bank's engagement in lobbying activities can be explained by the composition of its business revenues, we run a two-stage Heckman regression analysis, with the selection equation given by (5) and the response equation given by the following regression:
where Lobby i,t is one of the three following measures of connectedness: LobbyExpenses i,t , Lobbyists i,t , or LobbyM ix i,t . When regressing Lobbyists i,t over the independent vari-ables, we also include T otalAssets i,t−1 on the right hand side to control for the size of the BHC.
In order to test the third hypothesis, namely whether the announcement of the financial regulatory reform following the 2007 financial crisis exacerbated the lobbying intensity of BHCs with higher securitization and trading revenues, we run the following response regression in a two-stage Heckman regression analysis (where the selection equation is again given by (5)):
where Ref orm1 
Empirical results
The results for our three hypothesis tests are reported in tables 4 and 6.
Banks' aggregate characteristics and their decision to lobby
In this section, we investigate the impact of BHCs' key aggregate characteristics on their decision to lobby. In line with our first hypothesis outlined in section 3, we examine the impact of BHCs' financial strength, business composition, size, and geographical clustering on that decision.
As conjectured in our first hypothesis, the coefficient on T ierOne is negative and strongly significant in the selection regression. Thus, more leveraged banks, or those with more vulnerable balance sheets are more likely to lobby. Credit rating is positively related to a BHC's decision to lobby with a statistical significance at the one percent level. Since higher values of Rating refer to lower creditworthiness, our result implies that less creditworthy BHCs are more likely to engage in lobbying. This observation is consistent with our previous result regarding BHCs' capital ratios. The business concentration index has a negative and highly significant coefficient in the selection equation, suggesting that banks are more likely to engage in lobbying as their businesses become more diversified. This is in line with our initial conjecture that BHCs increase their lobbying efforts as they no longer restrict themselves to the traditional deposittaking and lending activities and venture into non-traditional businesses. The size of a BHC's total assets is, as expected, positively related to its decision to lobby. Hence, bigger banks and more diversified banks -in terms of their activities -, are more prone to engage in lobbying activities. Finally, we observe that the fixed effect F oreign is insignificant, whereas N ewY ork significantly negatively influences a BHC's decision to lobby.
Banks' sources of income and the intensity of their lobbying activities
We next test our second hypothesis and investigate the impact of BHCs' income sources on the intensity of their lobbying efforts, as measured by the amounts they spend on lobbying and by their lobbying manpower. The response equation results in table 4 (i.e. columns two to four) show that, confirming our expectation that BHCs with larger traditional deposit-taking and lending businesses lobby less intensely, income from loans is negatively related to a BHC's lobbying expenses with a statistical significance at the 1% level.
What also stands out from table 4 is that there are two businesses which are the most strongly and positively related to BHCs' lobbying activities, both in terms of money spent and of number of lobbyists hired: securitization and insurance. Indeed, consistent with our second hypothesis, the coefficient on securitization revenues is positive and Finally, let us point out that the inverse Mills' ratio is significant in each one of our response equations, hence indicating the presence of a selection bias which makes ordinary OLS regression analysis inappropriate for our study. The significance of the inverse Mill's ratio provides support for our choice of the Heckman-Probit estimation method.
Bank's sources of income and their choice of in-house versus external lobbyists
We are also interested in understanding the impact of various sources of income on a bank's choice between in-house and external lobbyists, and thus run a modified version of the regression testing our second hypothesis taking either one of the following dependent variables: InHouseLobbyists and ExternalLobbyists. The results of testing the corollary of our second hypothesis are reported in table 5.
The most striking result observed in table 5 is that, while BHCs hire in-house lobbyists to lobby on securitization issues, they tend to recur to external lobbyists when it comes to regulatory proposals affecting their trading activities. Indeed, external lobbyists may offer additional know-how on regulatory issues surrounding this complex source of revenue. A seven percent increase in the total income due to trading revenues leads to the hiring of an additional external lobbyist.
Given the complexity of insurance regulation, it is not surprising to find that BHCs with larger insurance businesses hire a higher number of both in-house and external lobbyists. The hiring of an additional external lobbyist happens at a somewhat higher rate though, as it requires an increase of only three percent of total income due to income ac-tivities, whereas the hiring of an additional in-house lobbyist requires an increase of 14%.
In the response equations reported in table 5, we replace the geographical cross-sectional fixed effect N ewY ork with the Distance variable to test our conjecture regarding lobbying efforts of BHCs closer to legislators. Since lobbying success depends to a large extent on lobbyists' personal connections, we expect a BHC to invest more in setting up an in-house lobbying team when its lobbyists can more frequently interact with legislators. Table 5 shows that geographical proximity matters, as Distance has a strongly significant and negative coefficient when considering the number of in-house lobbyists.
But when considering external lobbyists, geographical distance is, as expected, no longer significant. These results support the intuition that firms that are geographically closer to legislators have stronger incentives to set up in-house lobbying teams, since it will cost their lobbyists less time and effort to interact with legislators on a regular basis.
The effect of the announcement of the Dodd-Frank bill
Having analyzed the determinants of banks' lobbying activities in the previous sections, we now examine whether the announcement of the financial regulatory reform following the 2007 crisis has affected the intensity with which banks lobby. Our third hypothesis outlined in section 3 states that the announcement of stricter regulation led to more intense lobbying by BHCs whose sources of income strongly depend on businesses under increased regulatory scrutiny, in particular securitization and trading.
In order to test our third hypothesis, we employ panel regressions on banks' lobbying intensity as in table 4, except that we now introduce two interaction terms, lobbying expenses after the announcement of the financial reform.
Robustness checks
Two issues could potentially affect the robustness of our results, namely the omitted variable problem and reverse causality. The inclusion in our regressions of cross-sectional fixed effects capturing location and foreign ownership of BHCs does reduce but does not exclude the existence of an omitted variable problem. Moreover, it is also true that BHCs have been lobbying on numerous bills over our sample period and that some of these bills were not directly related to their financial and business characteristics. So there may very well be additional factors occasionally influencing a BHC's decision to intensify its lobbying efforts. For example, the decision by Citigroup to lobby on the Education Jobs and Medicaid Funding Bill (H.R.1586) in 2010:Q1 will hardly be captured by our estimation analysis -but neither is this the focus of our study nor do we believe such "non-finance-related bills" to be of primary importance to the banking sector.
The issue of reverse causality applies in particular to the variables defining banks' total assets, their various sources of income, as well as their tier one capital ratios. For instance, one could argue that higher revenues in a given business may be the result of intense bank lobbying, rather than the other way round. Since we always take one lag for the specification of the independent variables, this direct effect is already dealt with in the core of this study. Additionally, we run regressions taking two and three lags (results not reported in this draft), and find no changes in the significance of the empirical results. Furthermore, a robustness check for endogeneity is provided by our third hypothesis, where we study the effect of the announcement of the Volker rule on
BHCs' lobbying activities. The strongly significant impact of the announcement of the Volcker rule on the lobbying intensity of BHCs with higher trading revenues suggests that lobbying efforts increased in response to this natural experiment.
As an additional check of the direction of causation between each of the independent variables and each of the lobbying measures, we run Granger causality tests. Using the standard two-lag length specification, we are able to confirm that the following independent variables (Granger) cause each of our four lobbying measures: Loans, T rade, Insurance, BizConcentration, T ierOne. Furthermore, we are able to confirm that Securitization Granger causes banks' lobbying activities when taking three, four, or five lags. The only independent variable for which we are unable to determine the direction of causation is InvestBank.
6 Which banks do not lobby?
As we noted in section 4.1.1 above, 14 BHCs in our sample have never lobbied throughout the sample period 2001 to 2010. 15 Although these 14 BHCs are among the 50 largest BHCs in the US just as the other 35 BHCs that do (at least in some if not all quarters) lobby, they possess some specific characteristics that deserve to be mentioned. Table 7 shows that the non-lobbying BHCs are among the smallest BHCs in our sample in terms of their nominal total assets. Indeed, they hold an average of USD 
Conclusions
This study provides a first attempt to understand the determinants of BHCs' lobbying activities and the effect of recent financial regulation proposals on these activities. More precisely, we examine the relationship between banks' lobbying activities, on the one side, and their size, financial strength, business revenues origination, and geographical proximity, on the other. We also investigate the effect that the announcement of the financial regulatory reform in 2009 had on banks' lobbying activities as they relate to 15 See Appendix A.
the strength of their trading and securitization businesses' revenues.
We construct four measures of banks' lobbying activities intended to capture the quantitative and qualitative aspects of a bank's lobbying decision and its intensity. Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that banks are more likely to lobby when they are larger, have more vulnerable balance sheets, are less creditworthy, and have more diversified business profiles. Our second finding corroborates the fact that more diversified banks, mainly those engaged in non-traditional businesses, e.g. securitization and trading, or in highly regulated businesses, e.g. insurance, hire more lobbyists and spend larger amounts on lobbying. Similarly, banks engaged in tra- In other future work, it will also be important to investigate the degree to which banks' lobbying efforts are successful. That is, besides calculating the (absolute and • Renamings: This table reports the correlations i in quarter t. T ierOnei,t is BHC i's tier one capital in quarter t divided by the average of its total assets for leverage capital purposes in the same quarter. BizConcentrationi,t is a concentration index of BHC i's income sources in quarter t. Ratingi,t is Standard&Poor's domestic long-term issuer credit rating for BHC i in quarter t. Securitizationi,t is BHC i's net securitization income in quarter t. T radei,t is BHC i's trading revenue in quarter t from cash instruments and derivative instruments. Loansi,t is BHC i's interest and fee income in quarter t on loans in domestic and foreign offices. InvestBanki,t is BHC i's non-interest income in quarter t from fees and commissions from securities brokerage, investment banking, advisory, underwriting, and annuity sales. Insurancei,t is BHC i's underwriting income in quarter t from insurance and reinsurance activities. All income source variables are expressed in %age terms of total non-interest and interest income. T otalAssetsi,t is BHC i's total assets in quarter t. F oreigni is a dummy variable equal to 1 if BHC i is foreign-owned, 0 else. N ewY orki is a dummy variable equal to 1 if BHC i is headquartered in New York, 0 else. Distancei is the flying time in minutes between the city in which BHC i is headquartered and Washington DC. LobbyExpensesi,t is BHC i's total lobbying expenses in quarter t as a %age of its total assets in the same quarter. Lobbyistsi,t is the number of in-house and external lobbyists hired by BHC i in quarter t.
LobbyM ixi,t is the equally-weighted product of LobbyExpensesi,t and Lobbyistsi,t. T ierOnei,t is BHC i's tier one capital in quarter t divided by the average of its total assets for leverage capital purposes in the same quarter. Ratingi,t is Standard&Poor's domestic long-term issuer credit rating for BHC i in quarter t. Securitizationi,t is BHC i's net securitization income in quarter t. T radei,t is BHC i's trading revenue in quarter t from cash instruments and derivative instruments. Loansi,t is BHC i's interest and fee income in quarter t on loans in domestic and foreign offices. InvestBanki,t is BHC i's non-interest income in quarter t from fees and commissions from securities brokerage, investment banking, advisory, underwriting, and annuity sales. Insurancei,t is BHC i's underwriting income in quarter t from insurance and reinsurance activities. All income source variables are expressed in %age terms of total non-interest and interest income. T otalAssetsi,t is BHC i's total assets in quarter t.
F oreigni is an indicator equal to 1 if BHC i is foreign-owned, 0 else. N ewY orki is an indicator equal to 1 if BHC i is headquartered in New York, 0 else. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. is Standard&Poor's domestic long-term issuer credit rating for BHC i in quarter t. Securitizationi,t is BHC i's net securitization income in quarter t. T radei,t is BHC i's trading revenue in quarter t from cash instruments and derivative instruments. Loansi,t is BHC i's interest and fee income in quarter t on loans in domestic and foreign offices. InvestBanki,t is BHC i's non-interest income in quarter t from fees and commissions from securities brokerage, investment banking, advisory, underwriting, and annuity sales. Insurancei,t is BHC i's underwriting income in quarter t from insurance and reinsurance activities. All income source variables are expressed in %age terms of total non-interest and interest income. T otalAssetsi,t is BHC i's total assets in quarter t. F oreigni is an indicator equal to 1 if BHC i is foreign-owned, 0 else. N ewY orki is an indicator equal to 1 if BHC i is headquartered in New York, 0 else. Distancei is the flying time in minutes between the city in which BHC i is headquartered and Washington DC. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. A BHC is defined as a "lobbying BHC" if it has lobbied in at least one quarter during our sample period. T ierOnei,t is BHC i's tier one capital in quarter t divided by the average of its total assets for leverage capital purposes in the same quarter. BizConcentrationi,t is a concentration index of BHC i's income sources in quarter t. Securitizationi,t is BHC i's net securitization income in quarter t. T radei,t is BHC i's trading revenue in quarter t from cash instruments and derivative instruments. Loansi,t is BHC i's interest and fee income in quarter t on loans in domestic and foreign offices. InvestBanki,t is BHC i's non-interest income in quarter t from fees and commissions from securities brokerage, investment banking, advisory, underwriting, and annuity sales. Insurancei,t is BHC i's underwriting income in quarter t from insurance and reinsurance activities. All income source variables are expressed in %age terms of total non-interest and interest income. T otalAssetsi,t is BHC i's total assets in quarter t.
